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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The fol lowing i s s u e s a r e p resen ted in t h i s a p p e a l : 
1. Was the jury improperly ins t ruc ted tha t i t could 
convict defendant of d i s t r ibu t ing a controlled substance for 
value, if the jury found, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-202 (1978), that defendant had aided or abetted others to 
commit the crime? 
2. Should t h i s Court reverse defendant 's conviction on 
grounds that the evidence was insuf f ic ien t to support h is 
conviction? 
3. Should t h i s Court dismiss defendant 's argument tha t 
the t r i a l court had no author i ty to order him to reimburse Sevier 
County for fees paid to h i s t r i a l counsel? 
- i i i -
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Pi ;n lit i 1 < ''><."> [Hiiufrni
 r G J M No, "M)?H4 
v s . : 
LEONARD SCOTT, : C a t e g o r y No. 2 
De £ e n d a n t , ' A ppe J ] a i 11 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Vf* > was c o n v i c t e d of d i s t r i bu t i on of a c o n t r o ; . f d 
s u b s t a n c e i v a l u e , iii v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann, * 5 8 - 3 7 -
8(1) ( a ) ( i i ; \iyoj, as amended) • • , 
1 9 8 6 , in t h e S i x t h J u d i c i a l Di; : * " ^ i r , , : - S e v i e r 
County , S t a t e ol Utah , t h e Honorabl* l ,- .. :\ , • * . J <- . 
p r e s i d i n g , D e f e r i d a n t v» • a s s e n t e i :i < : e d b} J u d g e T e r v o r t • : • i :i ft j :i : i 1 6 ,-
1986 f t o s e r v e a term of ze T O t .o f i v e y e a r s i n t h e Utah S t a t e 
P r i s o n and o r d e r e d t o pa> a f i n e of $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . Botl i t i ie p r i s o n 
1
 • #• i i t e r i c ' f j andi I: :i i :te w€ >re s i I s p e n d e d n lj: o i i cc i :i :ii t i c • i t 1: ia t d e f er i :::!ai 11 
c o m p l e t e a tw o y e a r pe i: i o d of p r o ba t i o i I . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
0 n F e b r i i a i )f 1 ' 1 , ] 9 8 5 , 0 f f :i c e r £ , T o m J e • i \ s e i :i a i :i d D e 1 b e :i t 
L loyd of t h e S e v i e r County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e a r r a n g e d t o have an 
i n f o r m a n t , Doug J a m e s , p u r c h a s e m a r i j u a n a from d e f e n d a n t . The 
officers searched Mr. James and his vehicle thoroughly to be sure 
that he did not already possess any controlled substances, they 
had Mr. James wear an electronic listening device, and they gave 
him forty dollars to make the purchase (T. 48). 
The officers sat nearby in a vehicle, monitoring the 
listening device, as Mr. James entered defendant's residence and 
negotiated the sale of marijuana (T. 49). Both Officer Jensen 
and Officer Lloyd had had numerous personal contacts with 
defendant and recognized his voice as he spoke with Mr. James (T. 
54, 67). In response to Mr. James' asking whether he had any 
"weed" for sale, defendant said that he would sell James a bag 
for forty dollars (T. 54-55, 67). There was some haggling over 
the price, because the bag was light, and finally defendant 
agreed to sell the bag for thirty dollars (T. 54-55, 67). The 
officers heard further conversation indicating the culmination of 
the sale, then Mr. James left. Mr. James gave the officers ten 
dollars change from the forty he had been given and handed them a 
bag of what proved to be marijuana (T. 49-50, 68, 78). 
At trial, in addition to the two police officers, the 
State called a man named Mickey Sampson to the witness stand. 
Mr. Sampson had been with defendant at the time Mr. James 
approached him to buy marijuana. Mr. Sampson admitted that prior 
to trial he had told the police that he had personally seen 
defendant give Mr. James the bag of marijuana in exchange for 
cash (T. 85). Nevertheless, Mr. Sampson testified at trial that 
he did not actually see the money and marijuana change hands (T. 
85). Sampson said that he, defendant, and others had been 
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p l a y i n g c h e s s and w a t c h i n g t e l e v i s i o n » d e f e n d a n t * ! :r luum 
- - - nt of 
• . ' • . . t ; . .-. » ,- James o n . w - , d e f e n d a n t and 
James smoked a j o i nt tl la! had been . i"' ^ : i • r: ' k- tw«; , . , , 
88 89) Mi \ Ian x •£ ai kc K :I * • . . . - ^ T 
d i s c u s s e d p r i c e s w i t ! i d e f e n d a n t ( , "<• ^ *• Sampson 
t e s t i f i e d t h a t , w h i l e I ie di « i no t act .ual ly s e e t h e t r a n s a c t i o n 
ta kc: ' i 1 a ce,- I e 1: eJ i eved 11 iat de£ ei Idai 11 s t h P bag of mar I j uana 
i i. Mr , James (T. 85-86) • 
T : > u i t u d e f e n d a n t of d i s t r i b u t i o n cr 
. i- * v a l n p . and d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e c to 3 
*». a a r per 101: or p r o b a t i o n ,! 3 0 - 3 1 ) . •• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS . 
D e f e n d a i 1 } : c o n v i c t i o n of d i s t r i b u t i n g a c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e s h o u l d oe a f f i r m e d , because tin- t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t 
commit r e v e r 1 . 
Because d e f e n d a n t has not p r o v i d e d any a n a l y s i s i n 
s u p p o r t of h i s argument -- .. b e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t 
t:i::i a] was in I ' ' . 1 \ uppui t Jii'i c oiv J ot J O'li, i mis c l a i m 
t h a t tl ie e v i d e n c e *,- i n s u f f i c i e n t shou ld be r e j e c t e d . 
Because n ** supported by « le^al reasoning or 
a nil Iy M S, riffr - - !:t ie - o u r t had no 
a u t h o r i t y t o c:^t • , : - e imburse S e v i e : ' <>-..r . to: r ee f ^ a . d 
t o t u t t r i a l c o u n s e l , s h o u ^ j be r e j e c t e d . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE RE-
VERSED ON GROUNDS THAT THE JURY WAS IM-
PROPERLY INSTRUCTED. 
Defendant was convicted of distributing a controlled 
substance for value, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1) (a) (ii) (1953, as amended) [hereinafter "Distributing"].1 
Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible 
error when, quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1978) verbatim, 
the court gave the jury the following instruction: 
Every person acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct, which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. 
(Jury Instruction No. 22).2 This argument should be dismissed. 
In support of his argument that he was improperly 
convicted of Distributing, defendant relies upon State v. Hicken, 
659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983). In that case, defendant Hicken acted 
as a middle man, arranging for a drug dealer named Larsen to sell 
two lids of marijuana to an undercover agent. Although Hicken 
never took part in the exchange of cash and contraband between 
Larsen and the agent, he was charged with Distributing. The 
district court dismissed the Distributing charge on grounds that 
Hicken should have been charged with arranging a sale under Utah 
Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1953, as amended) [hereinafter 
1 Section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code is included in appendix A of 
the addendum to this brief. 
2 The record provided by defendant on appeal does not contain the 
instructions given to the jury. For purposes of argument, 
however, the State assumes that "Addendum Number 1" of 
appellant's brief contains accurate copies of the instructions 
actually given. 
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i ! -M' * e c t i n y I: :i e S t a t e ' s a i: g i :i i n e i 1t c • i: :i a | > pe a 1 11: :i a t 
. * r l v hp oitnci g u i l t y oi D i s t r i b u t i n g by a p p l y i n g 
*-..--?G2, * • ' g e n e r a l a i d i n g and a b e t t i n g s t a t u t e in t h e 
C r i m i n a l Cod* •• : v u i i s t a t e d , "The c o n t r o l l e d Substance*. / i t 
1 . pxpref , , anrj c p p ^ i f ^ ^ l l y s a n c t i o n s t h e 
o f f e n s e of a r r a n g i i lg for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of a c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e , 11 t h u s d i s p l a c e s i n t h a t f a c t s i t u a t i o n Jl " ie • get lei:a] 
s a n c t i o n fo r a i d i n n a n o t h e r p r o v i d e d i n ^ "76 2~?02 cl t h e 
C r i m i n a l Code. ' * *< \ ( emphas i s a d d e d ) . 3 
in* . : t . r* • * • :* : . > from Hicken . There 
i ? no e v i d e n c e IU^X, d e f e n d a n t a c t e d a t a n i d d l e man go -be tween 
1 . di;\L ;>*: c . * 1: • ' '• is«»' wr HI»* d e f e n d a n t must have 
oet-^ < >- - - ' • , • i b u t i n g . I n fo rman t 
Doug James e -• t d e f e n d a n t J r e s i d e n c e . a s k e d whe the r 
d e f e n d a n t h i m s e l f had any mari j ua i la fo r s a l e (T. 6 7 ) . Defend^-* 
* , Jaiiie:.! Iiatjijleij o< > ei p l i e r s - and t h e s a l e was ^pde fT 
A. i n d i c a t i o n s were t h a t d e f e n d a n t s o l d t l i e m a r i j u a n a t , * 
J a m e s , However, t h e S t a t e f a c e d a d i lemma: tne* « * ° !^ 
t est1n:ioi iy 11 iat de f endan t wa^ t i ie one who p h y s i c a l l y handed t h e 
m a r i j u a n a t o Mr. James exchange fo r c a s h , an- a t t - i a l d e f e n s e 
c o u n s e l r a i sed t h e ar guiu. i tin11 i l HI U jlI t 11 -. e been * ne t" 1 M," 
3 Subsequen t t o Hlcken y t h i s Cour t r e v e r s e d a D i s t r i b u t i n g 
c o n v i c t i o n i n S t a t e v. O n t i v e r o s y 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
Because § 7 6 - 2 - 2 0 2 c o n c e p t s of a i d i n g and a b e t t i n g were no t a t 
i s s u e i n t h a t c a s e , and b e c a u s e t h e f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n of t h a t 
c a se i s q u i t e d i s s i m i l a r t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , O n t i v e r o s does n u t 
appea r t o be h e l p f u l i n d e c i d i n g t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on t h i s 
a p p e a l . Moreover , t h e S t a t e b e l i e v e s t h a t O n t i v e r o s was 
i m p r o p e r l y d e c i d e d and h a s u rged t h i s Cour t t o o v e r t u r n t h a t 
d e c i s i o n . S e e , e . g. , B r i e f for Respondent a t 6-] 0 , S t a t e v . 
F i x e l , No. 860151 (Utah f i l e d August 2 2 , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
- 5 -
in the room who ac tua l ly del ivered the contraband i n t o Mr. James 
hands (e . c j . , T. 7 0 ) . 4 Even assuming the defendant was not the 
one who ac tua l ly del ivered the drugs t o the buyer, agency i s not 
a defense for of fenses charged under the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act. State v. Casias , 567 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1977); Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-2(6) (1953 as amended). Most l i k e l y the 
prosecutor was not aware of Casias and §58-37-2(6) and thus 
referred to §76-2-202 which properly s e t forth the law of aiding 
and abet t ing . The prosecutor's use of §76-2-202 should be 
considered a technical mistake and not r evers ib l e error. 
Further, the circumstantial evidence in t h i s case i s s u f f i c i e n t 
to prove that defendant received the money for the drugs. At the 
very l e a s t , defendant acted as a j o i n t part ic ipant in 
d i s t r i b u t i n g the marijuana and, under the circumstances, i t was 
proper for the t r i a l court to ins truct the jury that defendant 
could be found g u i l t y i f he phys ica l ly de l ivered the contraband, 
or i f (pursuant to § 76-2-202) he commanded, encouraged or 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y aided others to make the s a l e . 
Defendant i n t e r p r e t s Hicken as standing for the 
proposi t ion that accomplice l i a b i l i t y under § 76-2-202 can never 
a r i s e in connection with Di s t r ibut ing , in v i o l a t i o n of § 58-37-
8(1) ( a ) ( i i ) . Defendant misreads Hicken and overlooks t h i s 
4 The Sta te did not c a l l Mr. James t o t e s t i f y , because the po l i ce 
o f f i c e r s had promised Mr. James that , if he cooperated in buying 
drugs from defendant, he would not be ca l l ed as a prosecution 
witness (R. 41) . And, as noted above, Mickey Sampson, while 
admitting that he had previously to ld the po l i ce that he had seen 
defendant and Mr. James exchange marijuana for cash, denied at 
t r i a l that he had seen the actual exchange take place (R. 8 5 ) . 
- 6 -
Court's highly pertinent ruling in State v. Jeppson, 546 P.2d 894 
(Utah 1976). In Jeppsonf which involved a conviction for the 
distribution for a controlled substance for value, the defendant 
claimed—as does defendant here—that the Controlled Substances 
Act defined completely all culpable conduct and therefore a jury 
instruction incorporating the language of § 76-2-202 of the 
Criminal Code was improper. This Court disagreed and stated in 
reference to the jury instruction in that case: 
The first paragraph of Instruction 6B 
incorporates, in haec verba, provisions of 
76-2-202. It is applicable here, because 
the Controlled Substance Act does not 
specifically provide otherwise, nor does 
its context otherwise require. 
State v, Jeppson, 546 P.2d 894, 898 (Utah 1976). See also 
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974); Howe v. Jackson, 
18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159, 161 (1966). And in Hicken, this 
Court explained Jeppson as follows: 
Jeppson, supra, is distinguishable from the 
case under review. There the defendant was 
charged with aiding another because he had 
knowingly and intentionally made his 
trailer available to persons unlawfully pos-
sessing, using or distributing controlled 
substances therein. Id. at 895. There 
are no provisions in the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act dealing with the offense of 
proviaing a place for illegally selling 
drugs, and therefore the provisions of the 
Criminal Code may be resorted to. Con-
versely, the offense of arranging the sale 
of a controlled substance is clearly included 
in the Controlled Substances Act so that 
the governing language of § 58-37-19 comes 
into play and we do not look outside that 
Act. 
659 P.2d at 1040. It is clear from this Court's ruling in 
•7-
Jeppson5, and from the analys is of tha t case provided in Hicken 
tha t , for a var ie ty of circumstances involving v io l a t i ons of the 
Controlled Substances Act, §76-2-202 concepts of aiding and 
abe t t ing remain appl icable . As th i s Court s ta ted in Hickenf 
unless there are spec i f ica l ly conf l ic t ing provis ions in the 
Controlled Substances Act—as with the crime of Arranging—, §76-
2-202 may be resor ted t o . 
The present case i s an example of the proper 
appl ica t ion of §76-2-202 in connection with the crime of 
Dis t r ibu t ing . T i t l e 58 does not provide a spec i f i c , conf l ic t ing 
sanction for s i t ua t ions such as the present one; where there i s 
ambiguity as t o whether the defendant—who has never acted as a 
go-between in arranging for the d i s t r i b u t i o n of contraband— 
ac tua l ly made the physical exchange, or whether a co-par t ic ipant 
of the defendant might have handed the drugs to the buyer. Had 
the t r i a l court not given Ins t ruc t ion No. 22, there was a 
subs tan t ia l l ikel ihood tha t the jury would have f e l t i t s e l f 
required to acquit the obviously culpable defendant, on the mere 
t echn ica l i ty tha t i t might have been someone e lse in defendant 's 
party who ac tua l ly placed the drugs in to Mr. James' hands. 
Ins t ruc t ion No. 22 was properly given, and defendant 's argument 
should be dismissed. 
£ I t appears t h i s Court could have found the defendant in Jeppson 
gui l ty of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (2) (a) ( i i ) (1986): tha t i t i s 
unlawful for any owner of a building to permit the same to be 
occupied by persons unlawfully d i s t r i b u t i n g control led substances 
the re in . However, Jeppson i s s t i l l applicable to the ins tan t 
case since the concept a r t i cu l a t ed in Jeppson, i s cor rec t , i . e . 
t ha t if a factual s i t u a t i o n does not f i t within the Controlled 
Substance Act i t i s proper to resor t to the Criminal Code. 
- 8 -
POINT I I 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS IN-
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT HIM SHOULD BE DISMISSED, 
Without s u p p l y i n g any argument or a n a l y s i s , under Point 
I I of h i s b r i e f , defendant a f f i x e s t h e c a p t i o n "The Evidence 
Aga ins t Defendant was I n s u f f i c i e n t a s a Matter of Law, t o S u s t a i n 
the Jury V e r d i c t " and s t r i n g c i t e s four d e c i s i o n s from t h i s 
Court. There are a t l e a s t t h r e e reasons why t h i s a t tempt a t an 
argument should be d i s m i s s e d . 6 
F i r s t , d e f e n d a n t ' s argument should be d i s m i s s e d , 
because he has not provided any l e g a l or f a c t u a l a n a l y s i s a s t o 
why the e v i d e n c e was i n s u f f i c i e n t . S t a t e v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1 3 4 1 , 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since defendant f a i l s t o support [her] 
argument by any l e g a l a n a l y s i s or a u t h o r i t y , we d e c l i n e t o r u l e 
on i t . " ) . The S t a t e should not be put t o t h e task of d e v e l o p i n g 
d e f e n d a n t ' s arguments for him and t h e r e a f t e r demonstrat ing why 
t h e arguments are not v a l i d . 
Second, by f a i l i n g t o provide any l e g a l a n a l y s i s or 
argument whatever , defendant has not c a r r i e d h i s burden of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t he was improperly c o n v i c t e d , and for t h i s 
reason d e f e n d a n t ' s argument should be r e j e c t e d . S t a t e v. Jones y 
6 I t i s d i f f i c u l t for the S t a t e t o understand why de fense counse l 
r a i s e s the arguments t h a t he does under p o i n t s I I and I I I of h i s 
b r i e f . He p r o v i d e s no a n a l y s i s or argument in support of t h e s e 
c o n t e n t i o n s , and under h i s Summary of Argument s t a t e s , "However, 
t h e r e appears t o be noth ing in t h e record t o support t h e 
remaining p o i n t s [ p o i n t s II and I I I ] r a i s e d by de fendant , i . e . , 
i n s u f f i c i e n c y of the ev idence and l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n t o order 
reimbursement for a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . " (Br ie f of A p p e l l a n t a t 4 . ) 
I t i s unc lear why counse l f e e l s o b l i g a t e d t o r a i s e arguments on 
appeal which he h imse l f b e l i e v e s t o have no m e r i t . 
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657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982) ("The burden of showing error is 
on the party who seeks to upset the judgment.M). 
And finally, the details set forth and supported by the 
record in statement of facts of this brief, supra at 1-3, 
adequately establish that there was sufficient evidence upon 
which the jury could convict defendant. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT, THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER HIM TO REIMBURSE 
SEVIER COUNTY FOR THE FEES PAID TO HIS 
TRIAL COUNSEL, SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
Without s u p p l y i n g any argument or a n a l y s i s , under p o i n t 
I I I of h i s b r i e f , defendant a f f i x e s t h e c a p t i o n "The Court Below 
had no Author i ty t o Order A p p e l l a n t t o Reimburse S e v i e r County 
for the Fees Paid t o T r i a l Counse l ."7 For r e a s o n s s i m i l a r t o 
t h o s e c i t e d by the S t a t e in p o i n t I I of t h i s b r i e f , supra , 
d e f e n d a n t ' s argument should be summarily d i s m i s s e d . He has 
prov ided no f a c t u a l or l e g a l a n a l y s i s i n support of h i s argument, 
and t h e S t a t e should not be f o r c e d t o d e v e l o p h i s argument for 
him. Furthermore, h i s f a i l u r e t o even at tempt t o show how t h e r e 
was error in the proceedings below necessitates this Courtfs 
rejecting his argument. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984); State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982). 
7 Defendant is apparently referring to the condition of his 
probation that he repay the County of Sevier $1,980.00 for costs 
paid to his counsel at trial. (See R. 30-31.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon t h e f o r e g o i n g , d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of 
D i s t r i b u t i n g should be a f f i rmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submit ted t h i s / / day of December, 
1986 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K/HORNAK 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
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c o p i e s of the f o r e g o i n g b r i e f t o David L. Mower, a t t o r n e y for 
a p p e l l a n t , 151 North Main S t r e e t , P. 0 . Box 605 , R i c h f i e l d , Utah 
84701 , pos tage prepa id , t h i s // day of December, 1986. 
S B ^ X ^ Tr^sft^/gy 
- l i -
ADDENDUM 
APPENDIX A 
58-37-8- Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent 
to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) to distribute for value or possess with intent to distribute for 
value a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
||V (iii) to possess a controlled substance in the course of his business 
££ as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of sub-
Ik £ s tances l isted in Schedules II through V except under an order or 
^C prescription; 
IJ (iv) to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute or dispense a 
5$ controlled substance for value or to negotiate to have a controlled 
i ^ substance distributed or dispensed for value and distribute, dispense, 
or negotiate the distribution or dispensing of any other liquid, sub-
stance, or material instead of the specific controlled substance so 
offered, agreed, consented, arranged, or negotiated. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedules [Schedule] I or II is, upon 
conviction, guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree 
felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedules III and [or] IV, or mari-
huana is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a 
second or subsequent conviction punishable under this Subsection 
(l)(b)(ii) is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is, upon conviction, guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction 
punishable under this Subsection (l)(b)(iii) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
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(c) Except as authorized by this chapter, any person who knowingly 
and intentionally distributes a controlled substance, wherein nothing of 
value is exchanged for the distribution, is guilty of one degree less than 
the maximum penalty for the sale of that controlled substance for value. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this 
subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit the same to be occupied by 
persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances therein; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present. However, no person shall be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so. Any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent as provided 
in § 58-1-44 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis 
of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency. For purposes of this 
subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Subsection 
78-3a-2(3), and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other p>erson is 
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedules [Schedule] I and [or] II, or 
marihuana, is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree felony, except 
that if the amount of marihuana is over one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, that person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Upon a second 
or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by 
a person having previously been convicted under this Subsection 
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(2)(b)(i), that person shall be sentenced to one degree greater penalty 
than provided in this Subsection (2)(b)(i); 
(ii) all other controlled substances not included in Subsection 
(2Kb)(i), including less than one ounce of marihuana is, upon convic-
tion, guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and upon a second conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance as provided in this Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, or upon a third or subse-
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony, 
(c) Any person who violates Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a con-
trolled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a con-
trolled substance to another licensee or other authorized person not 
authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized 
by this chapter. 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3)(a) shall upon conviction be 
» punished by a civil fine of not more than $5,000. The proceedings shall be 
Jjj independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chap-
<( ter or any other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by informa-
££ tion or indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly 
£ or intentionally, that person is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree 
i felony. 
w$ (4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
5^ (a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtain-
ing a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself 
to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, 
veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, or to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of or 
procure the administration of, any controlled substance by misrepre-
sentation, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a pre-
scription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; 
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(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any ap-
plication, report, or other document required to be kept by this chap-
ter, or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance, 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (4)(a), upon conviction, is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not au-
thorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful 
under this section, Chapter 37a, Title 58, the Drug Paraphernalia Act, or 
under Chapter 37b, Title 58, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, 
shall, upon conviction, be subjected to the penalties and classifications set 
forth in Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school; 
(ii) on the grounds of such a school; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through such a school; 
(iv) within one thousand feet of any structure, facility, or grounds 
included in Subsections (5)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii); or 
(v) with a person under 18 years of age regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (5) is guilty of a first 
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five 
years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for 
this Subsection (5) would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or 
execution of the sentence shall not be suspended, nor shall the person be 
eligible for parole until the minimum term of imprisonment under this 
subsection has been served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (5), 
a person convicted under this Subsection (5) is guilty of one degree more 
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense, or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act oc-
curred was not as described in Subsection (5)(a) or was unaware that the 
location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specifically pre-
scribed is a misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense made un-
lawful by this chapter is, upon conviction, guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(8) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
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law. Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of an-
other state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another 
state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) Whenever it appeals to the court at the time of sentencing any 
person convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been 
convicted of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or 
another state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within 
this chapter and it appears that probation would not be helpful to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding § 77-35-20, may, provid-
ing compliance with Subsection (9)(b) has been met, impose a minimum 
term to be served by the defendant up to one-half the maximum sentence 
imposed by law for the offense so committed. 
(b) Before any person may be sentenced to a m i n i m u m term as pro-
vided in Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney or grand jury, if an 
indictment , shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint , in misde-
meanor cases , or the information or indictment, in addition to the sub-
s tant ive offense charged, a s ta tement set t ing forth the al leged past con-
viction of the defendant and specifically s tat ing the date and place of 
conviction and the ofTense of which the defendant w a s convicted. The 
al legat ion shall be presented to the defendant at the t ime of h i s arraign-
ment , or thereafter by leave of court, but in no event later than two days 
prior to the trial of the offense charged or the defendant's enter ing a plea 
of gui lty. At the t ime of arraignment or later date when granted by the 
court, the court shall read the al legat ion of the previous conviction to the 
defendant and provide h im or his counsel wi th a copy of the same and 
explain to the defendant the consequences of the al legat ion under Subsec-
t ion (9)(a). The al legat ion of the past conviction of the defendant is not 
ljV admiss ib le in a jury trial, except where the admissibi l i ty in evidence of a 
Kjs previous conviction is otherwise recognized as admiss ible by law. 
£g The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substantive of-
fC fense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the defendant 
j j of its decision to impose a minimum sentence within Subsection (9)(a) and 
<> inquire as to whether the defendant admits or denies the previous convic-
t s tion. If the defendant denies the previous conviction, the court shall afford 
• him an opportunity to present evidence showing that the allegation of the 
past conviction is erroneous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the 
defendant was pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record 
and following the evidence the court shall make a finding as to whether 
the defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court the 
defendant shall be sentenced in accordance with Subsection (9)(a) or un-
der the appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second ofTense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a) and (9)(b). 
(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts §§ 76-8-1001 
and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evi-
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dence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) Nothing in this section prohibits a veterinarian, in good faith and in 
the course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescrib-
ing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing such 
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
